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Abstract
Background: Although N95 filtering facepiece respirators and medical masks are commonly used for protection
against respiratory infections in healthcare settings, more clinical evidence is needed to understand the optimal
settings and exposure circumstances for healthcare personnel to use these devices. A lack of clinically germane
research has led to equivocal, and occasionally conflicting, healthcare respiratory protection recommendations from
public health organizations, professional societies, and experts.
Methods: The Respiratory Protection Effectiveness Clinical Trial (ResPECT) is a prospective comparison of respiratory
protective equipment to be conducted at multiple U.S. study sites. Healthcare personnel who work in outpatient
settings will be cluster-randomized to wear N95 respirators or medical masks for protection against infections
during respiratory virus season. Outcome measures will include laboratory-confirmed viral respiratory infections,
acute respiratory illness, and influenza-like illness. Participant exposures to patients, coworkers, and others with
symptoms and signs of respiratory infection, both within and beyond the workplace, will be recorded in daily
diaries. Adherence to study protocols will be monitored by the study team.
Discussion: ResPECT is designed to better understand the extent to which N95s and MMs reduce clinical illness
among healthcare personnel. A fully successful study would produce clinically relevant results that help clinician-leaders
make reasoned decisions about protection of healthcare personnel against occupationally acquired respiratory
infections and prevention of spread within healthcare systems.
Trial registration: The trial is registered at clinicaltrials.gov, number NCT01249625 (11/29/2010).
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Background
Healthcare personnel (HCP) are exposed to respiratory
pathogens in many clinical settings [1]. Infected HCP
may spread infection to their patients [2–5] or co-
workers [3–6], to family members [4, 7], or to other
community members [4, 8]. Respiratory viral infections
among healthcare workers can negatively impact delivery
of healthcare services [9–11].
United States national guidelines call for modes of
transmission to dictate infection control measures [3].
For most human respiratory viruses, the precise mode(s)
of person-to-person transmission is incompletely under-
stood [12, 13]. The predominant mode of transmission
for some human respiratory pathogens, such as influ-
enza virus, respiratory syncytial virus, and coronavirus is
believed to be droplet transmission. Airborne transmis-
sion plays a role with some human respiratory pathogens
via small aerosol particles, often called droplet nuclei
[3]. Airborne transmission is the predominant mode of
transmission for Mycobacterium tuberculosis [3, 14] and
recent evidence has suggested a larger role than previ-
ously thought for Influenza A and B viruses [15, 16].
Disposable respiratory protective devices (RPD) that fit
tightly to the wearer’s face, sometimes called air-
purifying respirators or filtering facepiece respirators,
are primarily designed to protect the wearer against in-
fection spread by ill patients. N95 filtering facepiece res-
pirators (commonly known as “N95 respirators”) are one
type of RPD capable, with proper facial fit and usage, of
reducing inhalation of airborne particulates by a factor
of 10 or greater [17]. Medical masks (MM), typically
called surgical masks in operative settings, are primarily
devised to protect patients against infection spread by
the wearer [18]. Both types of devices also serve as a
physical barrier keeping sprays and splashes of infectious
materials and contaminated hands and objects away
from oronasal region of wearer. Although RPD and MM
are capable of filtering particulates [19], RPD are
designed to filter smaller particulates that may remain
airborne for long periods. A tight seal between the respir-
ator and the wearer’s face is designed to prevent leakage
of particulates, a feature not provided by loose-fitting
MM. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) requires employers to
ensure each HCP, who may be exposed to airborne-
transmissible infections in the workplace, receives an RPD
with an adequate respirator-to-face seal that is determined
during a mandated annual “fit-test”.
However, evidence is inconclusive that RPD are better
than MM at protecting HCPs from respiratory infections
in clinical settings [20–25], despite tight-fitting RPD
produced by manufacturers, with higher levels of expos-
ure reduction validated by numerous laboratory studies
[19, 26–28], and the use of a complete respiratory
protection program (e.g., training, initial and annual fit
test) as defined by OSHA to protect HCP. Intuitively,
RPD should better protect HCP against airborne infec-
tions than MM, but objective evidence has not validated
this supposition. One possibility that may explain this
discrepancy between expectations and observations is
pragmatic: HCP, in general, do not tolerate N95 respira-
tors as well as medical masks [29, 30], perhaps prompt-
ing them to remove respirators more frequently and/or
for longer periods, increasing the likelihood of exposure
to infections. Models have shown that 25 % or more
non-wear time during exposure negates any significant
differences in protective ability between types of RPDs
[17, 31]. Given the difficulty with HCP adherence to
guidelines [4] and general dissatisfaction [4, 32–34] with
RPD, medical masks worn more consistently may pro-
vide similar levels of reduction in respiratory viral dis-
ease transmission as N95 respirators.
This key gap in knowledge has contributed to discrep-
ant clinical and public health recommendations about
respiratory protection for HCP [35, 36]. Needed are add-
itional well-designed clinical trials conducted in patient-
care settings during outbreaks of respiratory infections.
The following is an abridged version of the full research
protocol for the Respiratory Protection Effectiveness
Clinical Trial (ResPECT).
Objective
To compare the effectiveness of N95 respirators and
medical masks at protecting HCP from acquiring viral
respiratory illnesses in the workplace.
Hypotheses
Null Hypothesis: The incidence of laboratory confirmed
influenza (primary), influenza-like illness (ILI), acute re-
spiratory illness (ARI) and other respiratory infections will
not be different between HCPs who practice 2007 guide-
lines (medical masks) or 2009 guidelines (N95 respirators).
Alternative Hypothesis: The incidence of laboratory
confirmed influenza (primary), influenza-like illness
(ILI), acute respiratory illness (ARI) and other respira-
tory infections will be different between HCPs who prac-
tice the CDC’s 2007 guidelines for influenza protection
(medical masks) versus 2009 guidelines for influenza
protection (N95 respirators).
Methods
General overview
ResPECT is a prospective comparison of respiratory protect-
ive equipment to be conducted at multiple, geographically
distributed U.S. study sites. HCP who work in outpatient set-
tings will be cluster-randomized to wear N95 respirators
[37] or MM [38] for protection against infections dur-
ing respiratory virus season, the “intervention” period.
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The null hypothesis assumes N95 and MM intervention
groups will have no differences in outcomes, including (1)
laboratory confirmed influenza or (2) influenza-like illness
(ILI), (3) acute respiratory illness (ARI), and (4) laboratory
confirmed respiratory illness (LCRI). The alternative hy-
pothesis asserts the incidence of at least one outcome
would be different between intervention groups.
Because respiratory virus season varies year-to-year in
onset, severity, and duration, multiple season-years of
the study will be necessary to account for expected vari-
ance and optimally generalize the resulting knowledge.
The beginning of each season’s data collection will be
independently determined for each study site using an
epidemiologic predictive tool designed for ResPECT to
capture the largest possible number of respiratory
infections. These data will be collected for twelve weeks
each season.
Participant exposures to patients, coworkers, and
others with symptoms and signs of respiratory infection,
both within and beyond the workplace, will be recorded
in daily diaries. Adherence to study protocols will be
measured by the study team at each site. Since periodic
changes in infection control guidance and practice may
occur over the study years, participants will be expected
to adhere to the most up-to-date guidance issued by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
local policies at each study institution, at a minimum.
For example, a participant randomized to the MM arm
will be expected to don an N95 when participating in
an aerosol-generating procedure, assuming no further
changes in pertinent national guidance [39].
Participants and setting
The study participants will be recruited from outpatient
settings where patients are relatively likely to present
with symptoms and signs of acute respiratory infection.
Participants will be eligible to enroll for multiple study
seasons, yet each will be provided with informed consent
and complete enrollment procedures prior to each study
season.
Clinical Study sites will be distributed geographically:
1. Veterans Affairs New York Harbor Healthcare
System; New York, NY
2. Johns Hopkins Health System and University;
Baltimore, MD;
3. Washington DC Veterans Affairs Healthcare
System; Washington, DC;
4. Veterans Affairs Eastern Colorado Healthcare
System; Denver, CO;
5. Denver Health; Denver, CO
6. Childrens’ Hospital Colorado; Aurora, CO
7. Michael E. DeBakey Veterans Affairs Medical
Center; Houston, TX
Inclusion criteria
(1) Clinical study site leadership agree to have one or
more staff participate
(2) Participant meets the definition of “healthcare
personnel”
(a) Provides healthcare to patients and/or
(b) Routinely positions herself/himself within 6 feet of
patients (“close contact”) and
(c) Is a full-time employee (average of ≥ 24 hours/
week) working 75 % of the time at a study site and
not employed at another location where the study
is being conducted
(3) Participant is able to read and sign informed consent
(4) Participant agrees to all requirements of the
protocol, including fit-testing and diary-keeping
(5) Participant is age 18 years or greater
(6) Participant passes fit-testing for at least one of
the study respirator models and, if assigned to the
respirator arm, agrees to use that model for the
seasonal study period.
Exclusion criteria
(1) Participant self-identifies as having severe heart,
lung, neurological or other systemic disease that
one or more Investigator believes may preclude safe
participation.
(2) Participant is known to not tolerate wearing
respiratory protective equipment for any period.
(3) Participant has facial hair adornments or other
anatomic features that preclude respirator
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)-compliant fit-testing or proper fit during
the seasonal data collection period.
(4) Participant is advised by a study site occupational
health clinician (or other qualified clinician) to not
wear the same or similar respirator or medical
mask models used in ResPECT.
(5) Participant self-identifies as pregnant in the third
trimester during the seasonal study period.
(6) Participant is working in more than one ResPECT
study sites during the seasonal study period.
(7) Participant is working less than 24 hours per week
during the seasonal study period at a ResPECT
study site.
(8) Participant is working less than 75 % of the
seasonal study period at a ResPECT study site.
(9) Participant is a previous ResPECT study participant
who does not consent to have her/his data linked
from a previous viral respiratory season(s).
(10)In the opinion of a principal investigator,
participant may not be able to join the trial for any
other reason.
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Interventions
N95 respirators and medical masks
Participants will be cluster-randomized to one of the fol-
lowing N95 respirators or MM models, selected because
they are commonly used in U.S. medical facilities,
including the ResPECT study sites. Participants who
participate in more than one of the study years will be
cluster-randomized anew each year.
N95 Respirators:
(1) 3 M Corporation 1860, 1860S, and 1870 models
(St Paul, MN) or
(2) Kimberly Clark Technol Fluidshield PFR95-270,
PFR95-274 (Dallas, TX).
Medical Masks:
(1) Precept 15320 or
(2) Kimberly Clark Technol Fluidshield 47107.
Respirator Fit
All subjects participating in the study will be required
to pass an OSHA-accepted respirator fit test for the N95
respirator model(s) available at the study site. No fit test-
ing of medical masks will be performed as these devices
are not designed to be tight-fitting to the face and
studies [19, 20] have shown that their fit capabilities are
generally low.
Filter Performance
Although medical masks are loose-fitting, they create
a physical barrier that helps prevent splashes and sprays
from reaching the wearer’s mucous membranes. In
addition to passage around the mask, some of the small
particle aerosols are able to pass through the mask’s filter
media. Therefore, in addition to RPDs, filtration testing
was done on medical masks prior to enrollment of sub-
jects to ensure consistency between models across study
locations. The filtration performance of the N95 respira-
tors and medical mask models in the study were tested
in a manner similar to that used by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Devices were attached to a test fixture and placed in a
TSI 8130 automated filter tester operated with an air
flow rate of 85 liters per minute. The TSI 8130 uses a
photometer to measure the flux of light scattering from
aerosol particles. Polydispersed particles (mass median
diameter of ~0.3 microns) were generated from a 2 %
NaCl solution and passed through each device being
tested for 1 min. Each test was repeated 3 times with a
fresh N95 respirator or medical mask. To be certified as
an N95 respirator, filter penetration needs to be less than
5 % (or 95 % efficient). As shown in Table 1, the average
penetration percentages for the NIOSH certified N95
respirators were an order of magnitude lower than those
of medical masks, which are not NIOSH certified. Filter
results between N95 respirator models and between
medical mask models were comparable.
Filter airflow resistance was measured simultaneously
using the TSI 8130. As filter airflow resistance increases,
more energy expenditure is required for ventilation dur-
ing device wear and the greater potential for perception
of discomfort [40]. The medical mask models selected
for this study have filter airflow resistance levels about
half of that of the N95 respirators. However, one study
[40] found that subjective and physiological responses
were not different among subjects exercising while wear-
ing devices purposely made with different filter airflow
resistance levels (3 mm H2O, 6 mm H2O, and 9 mm
H2O) in the range similar to those of the devices in this
study (Table 1).
Adherence to intervention arm and hand hygiene
performance
Participants will be instructed to don a new N95/MM
with each patient interaction, every time a participant
encounter occurs within 6 feet of a patient who has sus-
pected or confirmed respiratory infection. Hand hygiene
will be recommended to all participants in accordance
with CDC guidelines [41] and policies at each study
institution. Trained research assistants will observe par-
ticipants during study periods to assess adherence to
their assigned intervention arms and hand hygiene. A
portable computer equipped with data recording soft-
ware (HandyAudit; Toronto, Canada) will be used to
document adherence. Participants will be expected to
complete surveys about their attitudes and opinions con-
cerning personal protective equipment before and after
each seasonal study period.
Estimation of exposure
During the twelve week data collection period each year,
participants will self-document (a) perceived occupa-
tional exposures to patients or coworkers who have
symptoms or signs of respiratory infection, (b) perceived
Table 1 Study RPD particle penetration and airflow resistance
Device name % penetrationa Resistance (mmH2O)
a
N95 respirators
3 M 1860/1860S 0.7 8.9
3 M 1870 0.3 9.6
Kimberly Clark Technol
Fluidshield PFR95-270/274
1.4 11.7
Medical Masks
Precept 15320 12.9 4.1
Kimberly Clark Technol
Fluidshield 47107
10.3 4.5
aAverage value from 3 replicate measurements
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non-occupational exposures to persons who have symp-
toms or signs of respiratory infection, (c) use of personal
protective equipment, and (d) personal symptoms or
signs of respiratory illness.
Study outcome definitions
Collection of specimens
Anterior nasal and pharyngeal swabs [42–45] [FLOQS-
wabs UTM (99–08024), Diagnostic Hybrids; Athens,
OH] will be collected by research assistants when
symptomatic with study defined respiratory symptoms,
as well as two, randomized asymptomatic swabs during
each seasonal study period. Swabs will be collected when
(a) participants self-report respiratory symptoms within
a 24 h period, and again if participants remain symptom-
atic after 7 days; and (b) randomly, on all participants,
twice during the active intervention period.
The Primary Outcome Measures will be the inci-
dence of:
Laboratory-confirmed influenza (LCI) A or B infection
in participants, defined as a) detection of influenza virus by
reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
in an upper respiratory specimen swab collected within
seven days of symptom onset, or b) influenza seroconver-
sion defined as at least a 4-fold rise in hemagglutination
inhibition antibody (HAI) titers to influenza A or B virus
from the pre- to post-season serological samples that is not
deemed attributable to vaccine.
The Secondary Outcome Measures will be the inci-
dence of:
(1) Acute Respiratory Illness (ARI) defined as the
occurrence of one sign or two symptoms (Table 2)
without laboratory confirmation.
(2) Laboratory Confirmed Respiratory Illness (LCRI)
defined as self-reported ARI plus the presence of one
or more RT-PCR confirmed infectious pathogens
(Table 3) in a specimen collected from the upper
respiratory tract and/or a clinically significant rise in
pre- and post-season serum antibody titers to
influenza A or B virus.
(3) Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) defined as temperature
of 100 °F [37.8 °C] or greater plus cough and/or a
sore throat, with or without laboratory
confirmation.
The incidence rate ratios between participants ran-
domly assigned to wear N95 respirators or medical
masks will be estimated for each of the primary and sec-
ondary outcomes.
Outcome determination, validation, and adjudication
Investigators will be paired and provided with blinded
information about clinical and laboratory data to
determine if a participant meets a primary or secondary
outcome. If the paired investigators do not agree, a prin-
cipal investigator will adjudicate the outcome.
Laboratory methods
Respiratory pathogen identification
Assays will be performed at Johns Hopkins University.
Collected respiratory specimens will be stored at −80 °C
until analyzed using multiplex PCR (PLEX-ID, Abbott
Labs, Chicago IL). Automated extraction of nucleic acid
(NA) from respiratory specimens will be performed utiliz-
ing NorDiag’s Arrow instrument and the Magna Pure ro-
botic system (Roche Indianapolis, IN) per manufacturer
instructions. Each extraction run will include a quality
control (NATrol Respiratory Validation Panel 3, Zeptome-
trix Inc., Buffalo NY); runs with control failures will be re-
peated. Purified NA will be amplified via RT-PCR using a
broad respiratory virus identification kit (PLEX-ID RVS
3.0, Abbott Molecular, Des Plaines, IL). Desalting of RT-
PCR product and electrospray mass spectrometry-based
NA analysis will be performed on the PLEX-ID analyzer
instrument. If funding is sufficient, samples will also be
assayed by RT-PCR for Bordetella pertussis, Mycoplasma
pneumoniae, and for Chlamydophila pneumoniae.
Table 2 Case definition of acute respiratory illness used in the
ResPECT study
Signs
Fever (T > 37.8 °C)
Tachypnea (Respiratory Rate≥ 25)
Coryza
Lymphadenopathy
Symptoms
Vomiting/Nausea
Diarrhea
Cough
Sputum production
Fatigue
Malaise
Headache
Sore throat
Dyspnea
Chills
Sweats
Arthralgias/Myalgias/Body Aches
Other gastrointestinal symptoms
*Acute respiratory illness (ARI) is defined as: The presence of one sign(s) OR
two symptom(s), as listed. Reported signs or symptoms must represent a
change from baseline
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Serologic testing
Each study season, blood samples will be collected twice
from each participant; one sample will be collected
within two weeks of the beginning of the intervention
period and a second within two weeks of the end of the
intervention period. Hemagglutination inhibition (HAI)
antibody assays will be performed on serum for influ-
enza A and B virus strains, dependent on the antigens in
each annual trivalent vaccine using standard methods
[46, 47]. In brief, serial 2-fold dilutions of serum samples
will be incubated with 8 hemagglutinin units of influ-
enza antigen and a turkey red blood cell suspension. The
serum HAI antibody titer will be defined as the dilution
factor of the highest serum dilution that completely
inhibits agglutination of turkey red blood cells in the
presence of type-specific hemagglutinin antigen. Assays
will be performed at the immunology core lab for the
study at the VA Saint Louis Veterans Affairs Healthcare
System.
Statistical methods
Randomization
To optimize compliance and generalizability, a cluster-
randomized design will be utilized. All participants
working in the same clinical unit will be assigned to
wear the same respiratory protective equipment (i.e., an
N95 or MM) during patient interactions for the entire
12 week seasonal study period. Clusters will be pair-
matched within each study site based on the characteris-
tics of each clinical cluster, including the (a) number of
participants (b) occupational location, such as an
emergency department, urgent care or primary care, (c)
patient population served, such as children or adults,
and (d) requirements for participants to wear additional
protective equipment, such as goggles donned by dental
hygienists. For each study season, the clinics in each
matched pair will be randomly assigned to opposing
study arms. For matched pairs participating in multiple
study seasons, random sequences of arm assignments
will ensure each is assigned to both study arms during
the multi-year study. Each study season, an individual
not involved in the study implementation and data
analyses will perform the randomization scheme for each
study site, using a random number generator in Microsoft
Excel. The principal investigators will be blinded to the
randomization scheme prior to assignment.
Statistical analyses
Incidence rates of LCI, ARI, ILI, and LCRI among
cluster-randomized participants will be compared. The
relationships between incidence of clinically diagnosed
and laboratory-confirmed illnesses will be analyzed with
attention to potential confounders, such as participants’
demographics, study arm compliance, attitudes and
opinions about infection control, receipt of influenza
vaccination, and infectious exposures within and beyond
the workplace. Standard statistics will describe baseline
characteristics and follow-up measures, summarized by
treatment arm and stratified by study site.
To assess the primary outcome, a logistic regression
model will be fit using a dichotomous variable to indi-
cate whether a participant became infected with a re-
spiratory pathogen. The odds of infection between the
two treatment groups will be reported with a 95 % confi-
dence interval. For secondary outcomes, Poisson log-
linear mixed effects regression models will assess the dif-
ference in seasonal respiratory infection rates between
intervention groups. Cluster- and individual-level ran-
dom effects will be considered to account for clustered
observations. Additional covariates may be added to the
models to adjust for confounding.
Missing data
Participants will be encouraged to complete the study.
Those who withdraw from an intervention arm will be
encouraged to complete follow-up laboratory specimen
collection. An intent-to-treat analysis, in which all avail-
able data on all randomized participants are included,
will be used for the primary comparison of interven-
tions. A per-protocol secondary analysis will compare
treatment effectiveness, accompanied by a planned
sensitivity analysis that accounts for participants from
whom researchers were not able to obtain a second
serological sample.
Table 3 Potential influenza like illness pathogens
Influenza A
Influenza B
Respiratory syncytial virus type A
Respiratory syncytial virus type B
Parainfluenza virus type 1
Parainfluenza virus type 2
Parainfluenza virus type 3
Parainfluenza virus type 4 (a)
Parainfluenza virus type 4 (b)
Human Metapneumovirus
Adenoviruses
Coronavirus OC43
Coronavirus NL63
Coronavirus 229E
Coronavirus HKU1
Human Rhinovirus
Cocksackie/echoviruses
Bocavirus
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Sample size and power calculations
To detect a 25 % reduction (i.e., a relative risk of 0.75) in
the incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza or
laboratory confirmed respiratory illness among par-
ticipants wearing an N95 respirator, compared to par-
ticipants wearing a medical mask, ResPECT will need
to accumulate approximately 10,024 or 5104 person-
seasons of data over four seasons respectively.
Sample size calculations are based on several assump-
tions about the incidence rate and levels of within-
cluster correlation. The attack rate laboratory-confirmed
influenza during a single study season is assumed to be
20 % among unvaccinated individuals in the medical
mask group. We assume 65 % of our population will be
administered a vaccine that is 65 % effective in pre-
venting influenza infection. Vaccine effectiveness at the
higher end of published reports (86 % in health care
workers) will lead to a reduction in the yearly attack rate
to approximately 8.8 %, and effectiveness at the lower
end of published reports (51 % in the general popula-
tion) would lead to an increased yearly attack rate of ap-
proximately 13.4 %. Importantly, the anticipated effect
on the needed sample size of annual variations in influ-
enza incidence is larger than the expected impact of
variation in vaccine effectiveness.
The ResPECT study will need 157 independent clus-
ters with a median size of 16 participants each to achieve
80 % power to detect a relative risk of 0.75 between N95
and surgical masks at preventing laboratory-confirmed
influenza infection, with a Type-I error rate of 0.05. The
total number of individuals participating each season
will need to be approximately 2506, with 10,024 total
person-seasons accumulating over the multi-year study.
For the secondary outcome of laboratory confirmed re-
spiratory illness, the estimated total number of clinics
will need to be 80, the total number of individuals par-
ticipating each season will need to be 1276, and total
person-seasons accumulated need to be 5104 (Table 4)
over the multi-year study. The sample size are made
using the clusterPower software package for R [48].
Power is estimated using an expected annual attack rate
of 12 % {12 % = 0.35*0.2 + 0.65*(1–0.65)*0.2} [13]. This
yearly attack rate translates into a 4-year attack rate of
39 % {39 % = 1-(1-(0.35*0.2 + 0.65*0.35*0.2))4. Account-
ing for correlation of outcomes within clusters by
assuming the correlation coefficient is 0.1, leads to a de-
sign effect of 2.5.
For scenarios representing the lower and higher ends
of anticipated attack rates in the medical mask group,
two quantities were calculated (a) the power to detect a
relative-risk of 0.75 between the N95 group and the
medical mask group and (b) the relative-risk that can be
detected with 80 % power (Table 5). For all of these cal-
culations the two-sided Type I error probability is 0.05.
Sensitivity analysis
Potential outcome analysis for laboratory-confirmed
influenza Some data on the primary outcome may be
missing due to participants withdrawing from the study
early and missing the second serological sample. To ac-
count for the unavoidable uncertainty posed by missing
primary outcome data, due to participant withdrawal or
loss of follow-up, a sensitivity analysis will be conducted
that randomly assigns binary outcomes to participants
who did not complete the study. A two-dimensional grid
will be created that varies the influenza attack rates
among participants who withdraw. Withdrawal attack
rates in both arms will be fixed between half and twice
the observed attack rates, based on complete data. By
varying these two parameters across the grid, and for
each combination, the adjusted odds ratio will be calcu-
lated by averaging across n = 50 imputed datasets for
each point on the grid.
Analysis of differential withdrawal The characteristics
at the time of randomization for participants without
complete follow-up will be examined. To assess the
potential biases introduced by differential withdrawal
among different N95 respirators, a comparison of with-
drawal rates and time to withdrawal will be included as
an ancillary analysis to the analyses of the primary and
secondary outcomes.
Ethical approvals
ResPECT will be approved by the institutional review
board at each participating study site and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, prior to study initi-
ation. (An unabridged version of the ResPECT protocol
was approved by the intitutional review board at each
study site and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention).
Table 4 Sample size and power calculations for primary and
secondary outcome
Laboratory confirmed
influenza
Laboratory confirmed
respiratory illness
Annual attack rate,
Medical Mask group
0.12 0.25
Cumulative 4-year attack
rate, Medical Mask group
0.39 0.68
Detectable relative risk 0.75 0.75
Median cluster size 16 16
ICC 0.1 0.1
Total person-seasons of
observation
10,024 5104
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Data safety monitoring board
A Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) consisting
of three or more members will be convened. Members
with germane expertise in clinical infectious diseases, epi-
demiology, and clinical trials will be sought, changing in
number and composition to meet study needs. The DSMB
will independently monitor interim data, to which the in-
vestigators will be blinded, identifying an appropriate
times for protocol modification or termination.
Sponsors
ResPECT is jointly funded by the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (Veterans Health Administration) and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and the
Biomedical Advanced Research Project Authority).
Discussion
Viral respiratory infections cause a wide range of
illnesses, varying from mild to severe, in HCPs who may
spread infection to their patients, family members, and
other community members. Healthcare-associated infec-
tions cost $10B annually in U.S [49]. Factors influencing
transmission of respiratory infections in healthcare
facilities include the population density of ill patients in
healthcare settings, the types of exposures within health-
care settings, the administrative and physical structures
of healthcare facilities, and intrinsic characteristics of
virulence [3]. Measures to prevent transmission within
healthcare facilities include HCP vaccination, hand-
hygiene, cleaning and disinfection of inanimate surfaces,
pre- and post-exposure antiviral chemoprophylaxis, pa-
tient isolation, and personal protective equipment [3, 6].
ResPECT is designed to better understand the extent to
which PPE, specifically represented by differences in ex-
posure reduction afforded by N95s and MMs, reduces
clinical illness among HCPs.
While it may seem that N95 respirators should better
protect HCPs than MM against airborne infections in
the workplace, this notion has not been validated by
objective clinical evidence. Low tolerance to respirator
wear among HCPs may prompt more frequent or longer
periods of removal, compared to MM, to an extent that
the benefits of higher levels of filtration and lower levels
of leakage around the facial seal afforded by respirators
is offset or subjugated.
Key sources of variability in HCP health outcomes are
difficult to control for, even in a rigorously designed
clinical study such as ResPECT. For example, the inabil-
ity to prevent HCP community exposures to respiratory
infections and the inherent year-to-year variation of viral
respiratory infections provide a challenging setting in
which to evaluate the effectiveness of personal protective
equipment. While community-acquired infections may
pose a significant source of exposure for HCPs, this type
of exposure, if occurring non-differentially between
study arms, would bias the results from ResPECT to-
wards the null hypothesis.
Key reasons for choosing a cluster-randomized
design are (a) to increase compliance by equipping all
members of a healthcare team with the same equip-
ment and (b) to capture indirect effects of the inter-
vention at the cluster-level, such as herd immunity
[50].
A fully successful study would produce clinically rele-
vant results that help clinician-leaders make reasoned
decisions about protection of HCPs against occupation-
ally acquired respiratory infections and prevention of
spread within healthcare systems.
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Table 5 Power analysis of the sensitivity to the 4-year attack rate
Low attack rate scenario High attack rate scenario
Outcome Medical mask
attack rate
Power
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Detectable RR
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attack rate
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(RR = 0.75)
Detectable RR
(80 % Power)
Primary 0.2 43 % 0.62 0.5 93 % 0.80
Influenza like illness 0.15 33 % 0.56 0.4 82 % 0.76
Acute respiratory illness 0.5 93 % 0.80 0.95 100 % 0.94
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